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The two main solution concepts of strategic form games, Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951)
and correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974, 1987), are based on the implicit assumption
that when players take actions they know, or have an accurate belief, regarding the joint
strategy played by the other players. This paper deals with a variant of correlated equi-
librium, called partially-speciﬁed correlated equilibrium (Lehrer, 2005), whereby each
player has partial information about the strategies played by the other players.
A correlated strategy is a probability distribution over the joint strategies of all
players. A mediator randomly selects a joint strategy according to a correlated strategy
and recommends each player to play her component. In a correlated equilibrium this
recommendation, which has no eﬀect on payoﬀs, is a best response to the conditional
joint strategies played by the other players. Thus, a correlated equilibrium is a Nash
equilibrium of an extension of the game, whereby prior to taking an action each player
receives a private payoﬀ-irrelevant signal.
In a partially-speciﬁed correlated equilibrium a mediator recommends a strategy to
each player, but the correlated strategy is not fully known to the players. In particular,
when a player receives a recommendation she does not know the conditional strategy of
the other players. Rather, she receives a partial information about it. Formally, each
player is informed of the expectation of some, but not all, random variables deﬁned over
the set of all other players’ joint strategies. For instance, a player may be informed of the
probability that the other players play a joint strategy in a certain set, without knowing
the probability of each strategy proﬁle within this set.
Realistically speaking, it is unreasonable to exclude the possibility that players have
only partial knowledge about their opponents’ behavior, and they are therefore lead to
partially-speciﬁed equilibrium. Our goal is to study interactions with partial knowledge
on the opponents’ behavior, and to ﬁnd a natural decentralized learning procedure that
converges to the set of partially-speciﬁed correlated equilibria.
There are several known procedures that converge to the set of correlated equilibria.
These procedures are based on a full monitoring assumption, or at least on a condition
that amounts to observable payoﬀ (see, for instance, Foster and Vohra (1997), Fudenberg
and Levine (1999) and Hart and Mas-Colell (2000, 2001)).
We construct a procedure that converges to the set of partially-speciﬁed correlated
1equilibria in the when monitoring is imperfect. As in Hart and Mas-Colell (2000), this
procedure is based on regret minimization.
When payoﬀs are observable a player’s regret is the diﬀerence between her actual
payoﬀ and the maximal payoﬀ she could have received had she known at the outset of the
game the empirical distributions of actions played by the others. When the player does
not observe her payoﬀs, but rather a noisy signal of these payoﬀs, she cannot calculate
these two quantities, and hence this deﬁnition of regret is unsuitable. We introduce a
new deﬁnition of regret and a procedure that minimizes it in sequential decision problems
with imperfect monitoring.
The issue of having no regret in such decision problems has been treated so far only
in the sense that the average payoﬀ over the entire history is no less than the worst payoﬀ
consistent with the signals obtained. This setup is known as external no-regret.
Consider a decision maker (DM) who chooses an action at every stage, and whose
payoﬀ depends on her action and on the realized state of nature. The evolution of the
state variable is unknown. DM does not observe the state, but receives a noisy signal that
depends on the state of nature and on the action chosen. In such a model of imperfect
monitoring, the stage optimal strategy may be mixed. Indeed, consider, for instance,
the ‘matching pennies’ game, where DM chooses a row, T or H (an “action”), nature
chooses a column T or H (a “state”), and the payoﬀ to DM is 1 if the two choices match,
and 0 otherwise. When DM receives no information about the state, choosing T or H
with equal probabilities guarantees her the best of the worst-case scenario payoﬀs. In
this sense the uniform mixed strategy is the unique best response.
A strategy is external regret-free if for every ﬁnite horizon suﬃciently long, the em-
pirical distribution of the actions of DM is optimal, assuming that nature chooses a
stationary strategy that is consistent with the observed signals. In the example of the
‘matching pennies’ with no signals, the distribution [1
2(T), 1
2(H)] is optimal. Therefore,
any strategy that chooses each action half of the times is external regret-free. In par-
ticular, the deterministic strategy that plays T in odd stages and H in even stages is
external regret-free. However, this strategy is vulnerable to an adversarial nature which
chooses, for instance, H in odd stages and T in even stages (possibly after realizing that
DM behaves in a learnable pattern). The stationary strategy [1
2(T), 1
2(H)], however, is
immunized against regrets, because nature cannot hurt DM even if it learns that DM
uses it. In other words, the stationary strategy [1
2(T), 1
2(H)], guarantees the maxmin
payoﬀ against any choice of states.
2Suppose that in a general sequential decision problem with imperfect monitoring DM
uses a stationary strategy. The empirical frequency of the signals provides only a partial
information about the frequency of states. DM can calculate the set of all distributions
over states that are consistent with his observations, and may wonder whether he has
done his best against this set. As diﬀerent individuals might have diﬀerent attitudes
toward a set of plausible distributions, we allow DM to have a subjective response cor-
respondence. This correspondence indicates what actions best respond to any set of the
opponents’ strategies in DM’s subjective view. For example, a pessimistic DM would
have a response correspondence that chooses the actions that maximize the worst-case
payoﬀ, while an optimistic one would chooses the actions that maximize the best-case
payoﬀ.
Given a response correspondence, a strategy in the sequential decision problem is
conditional regret-free, if every mixed action that is played frequently is a best response
(w.r.t. to the response correspondence) to the set of all strategies that are consistent
with the signals observed while playing this action.
Viewed diﬀerently, suppose that DM has several agents, each can execute a diﬀerent
mixed action. At every stage DM chooses one agent, ask him to play the game and
report back the signal he observed. The strategy of DM is conditional regret-free if the
mixed action played by any agent that has been frequently chosen is optimal given the
signals that the agent received.
In the general case of imperfect monitoring we prove that subject to some weak con-
ditions (on the response correspondence) there exists a conditional regret-free strategy.
When applied to the worst-case response correspondence, we obtain a particularly impor-
tant conditional regret-free strategy. It ensures that any mixed action which is frequently
played, guarantees the maxmin level against an adversary nature restricted to choosing
states according to the distributions that are consistent with the signals received.
This result enables us to deﬁne a procedure that converges to the set of partially
speciﬁed correlated equilibria in an n-player game with imperfect monitoring. Suppose
that each player faces a sequential decision problem, in which she perceives the other
n − 1 players as “nature”. Analogously to the case of full-monitoring, if each player
plays an conditional regret-free strategy w.r.t. the worst-case response correspondence
in her sequential decision problem, the play converges to the set of partially speciﬁed
correlated equilibria. By letting the players play conditional regret-free strategies w.r.t.
other response correspondences, we may obtain diﬀerent notions of partially speciﬁed
3correlated equilibria.
Our results concerning the existence of conditional no-regret strategies extend those
that study external no-regret strategies with imperfect monitoring, and those that study
internal no-regret with perfect monitoring; these include Rustichini (1999), who stated
that (external) regret-free strategies exists, Mannor and Shimkin (2003), who proved
it when the player’s choices do not aﬀect the signals, Cesa-Bianchi, Lugosi, and Stoltz
(2006), who showed a regret-free procedure under the condition that the payoﬀ matrix of
a player can be obtained through a linear transformation from the signalling structure,
and Lugosi, Mannor and Stoltz (2007), who proved the general case. In another strand
of the literature, Hart and Mas-Colell (1999, 2000) and Blum and Mansour (2007) dealt
with internal regret in the perfect monitoring case.
The paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we deﬁne partially speciﬁed probabil-
ities and partially speciﬁed correlated equilibrium. In Section 3 we present the model of
sequential decision problem, and present our main results. Proofs appear in Section 4.
2 Partially-speciﬁed equilibrium
2.1 A partially-speciﬁed probability
An urn contains 90 balls, 30 are Red, 40 are Black, and 20 are White. This information
is equivalent to saying that the expectation of the random variable1 [1(R),0(B),0(W)] is
1
3, the expectation of the random variable [0(R),1(B),0(W)] is 4
9, and the expectation of
the random variable [0(R),0(B),1(W)] is 2
9. Moreover, one can calculate the expectation
of every random variable deﬁned over the state space {R,B,W}.
Suppose now that it is known that 30 balls are Red and the other are either Black or
White, but there is no indication as to how the Black and White balls are distributed;
the distribution of colors is partially speciﬁed. The probability of only one non-trivial
event is known: the probability of Red is 1
3. Equivalently, the expectation of the ran-
dom variable [1(R),0(B),0(W)] is 1
3, but the expectations of the two random variables
[0(R),1(B),0(W)] and [0(R),0(B),1(W)] are unknown. Observe that the expectation
of the random variable [1(R),1(B),1(W)] is known as well — it is 1.
1That is, the probability of Red is 1, and the probability of both Black and White is 0. We identify
a random variable with its distribution.
4Suppose that as before there are 30 Red balls, 60 balls which are either Black or
White, and an unknown number of Green balls. In addition it is known that the number
of Green balls is the same as the number of White balls. The probability of Red in no
longer 1
3. Furthermore, the probability of no non-trivial event is known. Nevertheless,
some information about the distribution of colors is available. It turns out that this
information is given by the expectation of two random variables.
Denote by X the random variable [0(R),0(B),1(W),−1(G)] that takes the value 0 on
Red and Black, 1 on White, and −1 on Green. Since the probabilities of White and Green
are equal, the expectation of X is 0. Let Y be the random variable [1(R),0(B),0(W), 1
3(G)].
It turns out2 that the expectation of Y is 1
3.
These examples motivate the following deﬁnition.3
Deﬁnition 1 Let Ω be a ﬁnite set. A partially-speciﬁed probability over Ω is a pair
(P,Y), where P is a probability distribution over Ω, and Y is a set of random variables
deﬁned over Ω that contains the indicator of Ω.
The interpretation of (P,Y) is that only the expectations of the random variables in
Y w.r.t. P are known. We call Y the information structure.
Example 1 Let Ω be a ﬁnite state space, and let P be a probability distribution over
Ω. The states in Y are not directly observed. Rather, every ω ∈ Ω is associated with a
distribution, say s(ω), over a ﬁnite set of signals S. The states are realized sequentially.
At every stage a state is randomly drawn from Ω according to P, independently of past
drawings. When ω is selected the random signal s(ω) is observed. That is, the signal
actually observed is randomly selected from S according to the distribution s(ω).
The long-run empirical frequency of the signals converges to
P
ω∈Ω P(ω)s(ω). In other
words, the observer asymptotically learns the expectation of the |S| random variables
Yt, t ∈ S, where for each ω ∈ Ω, Yt(ω) takes the value s(ω)(t), which is the probability
of the signal t according to the distribution s(ω).










3In the current context all the sets are ﬁnite and therefore measurability consideration is ignored.
However, in general those should be taken into consideration, and the deﬁnition should be amended
accordingly.
5The partially-speciﬁed probability (P,Y) determines the set of all probability dis-
tributions that agree with P on the variables in Y. Formally,4 C(P,Y) = {Q ∈
∆(Ω); I EQ(Y ) = I EP(Y ) for every Y ∈ Y}. The set C(P,Y) is convex and compact
and, moreover, it is an intersection of ∆(Ω) with a plane.
2.2 The n-player game and partially-speciﬁed correlated strate-
gies
Let G = (N,{Ai}i∈N,{ui}i∈N) be an n-player game, where N is the set of the n players,
Ai and ui are player i’s ﬁnite action set and utility function.
The concept of correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974, 1987) refers to a case where the
players obtain some (correlated) information prior to playing the game. This information
need not be related to the game itself (and usually is not). Neither it is related to the
state of nature in the case of a game with incomplete information, nor to the payoﬀs.
The actions taken by a player depend only on her information.
In a correlated equilibrium with a fully-speciﬁed probability, the information a player
obtains prior to playing the game can be reduced to a particular pure strategy. The
incentive-compatibility conditions of the equilibrium determine that this pure strategy is
a best response to the conditional mixed strategy played by the others. The reason why
the reduction to pure strategies is not restrictive is that when a mixed strategy is a best
response, every pure strategy in its support is a best response as well. However, in the
case that the probabilities are partially speciﬁed, this is no longer true. Typically, when
a mixed strategy is a best response to the other players’ partially-speciﬁed joint strat-
egy, neither of the pure strategies played with a positive probability is a best response.
Therefore, in partially-speciﬁed correlated equilibrium, the recommendation received by
a player is to play a mixed strategy.
Formally, prior to playing the game, a point (p1,...,pn) ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai) is randomly
selected according to a distribution Q over ×i∈N∆(Ai). Player i is informed of pi and, in
addition, receives partial information regarding Q(·|pi), i.e., the expectation w.r.t. Q(·|pi)
of some, but not all, random variables deﬁned over ×j6=i∆(Aj). W.l.o.g. we assume that
the information that the player receives depends only on pi, and not on p−i.5 The set
4For every ﬁnite set S, ∆(S) is the set of probability distributions over S.
5If this is not the case, and diﬀerent mixed proﬁles p−i give player i diﬀerent information, we can
consider an equivalent situation in which the information that player i receives upon receiving the
6of these random variables is denoted by Yi,pi. We denote Y = (Yi,pi)i∈N,pi∈∆(Ai). Having
received the recommendation to play pi, player i now possesses the partially-speciﬁed
probability (Q(·|pi),Y).
The pair (Q,Y), which speciﬁes the distribution according to which proﬁles of mixed
actions are drawn and the information known to each player, is called a partially-speciﬁed
correlated strategy. The following example clariﬁes the deﬁnition of this notion.
Example 2 Consider a three player game, with the action sets {T,B} for player 1,
{L,R} for player 2, and {W,E} for player 3. A mixed action proﬁle is denoted by three
numbers (x1,x2,x3) in [0,1]3, where xi is the probability that player i to play his ﬁrst
action. Let Q be the distribution that gives weight 1
8 to each of the 8 mixed action proﬁles
in the set {1
3, 1




player 1, upon receiving the recommendation 1
3, only knows the recommendation of player
2. In addition,
Y1, 1
2 := {x2 − x3,1}.
The interpretation of this information structure is that when receiving the recommenda-
tion 1
2, player 1 cannot distinguish between the cases where the recommendations of the
other players diﬀer (i.e., players 2 and 3 both received the recommendation 1
3 and the
case where both received the recommendation 1
2). However, if the recommendations of
players 2 and 3 are diﬀerent, then player 1 is fully informed of these recommendations.
Deﬁne
Y2, 1
3 := {x1 + x3,1}.
When receiving the recommendation 1
3, player 2 cannot distinguish between cases where
the recommendations of the other players diﬀer. The sets Y2, 1
2, Y3, 1
3, and Y3, 1
2 can be
similarly deﬁned.
Note that according to the deﬁnition, the information a player obtains about the
others may depend on her action.
recommendation pi already incorporates the information that depends on p−i.
72.3 Partially-speciﬁed correlated equilibrium
A partially-speciﬁed correlated strategy (Q,Y) is a partially-speciﬁed correlated equilib-
rium if the recommended action of a player guarantees the maxmin level against the
other players’ action proﬁle that are informationally equivalent to the conditional action
proﬁle actually being used. Formally, denote by p−i|pi the expected conditional mixed
action proﬁle of players −i = N \ {i}, w.r.t. Q, when player i is recommended to play
pi. When player i obtains the recommendation to play pi he obtains also a partially-
speciﬁed probability (p−i|pi,Yi,pi) about the other players’ conditional action. The set
C(p−i|pi,Yi,pi) consists of all joint strategies b p−i of players −i that are indistinguishable
from p−i | pi given player i’s information. That is, b p−i ∈ C(p−i|pi,Yi,pi) if and only if
under b p−i the expectations of the random variables in C(p−i|pi,Yi,pi) under b p−i match












is the worst case payoﬀ when player i plays pi and players −i play
a strategy in C(p−i|pi,Yi,pi).
Deﬁnition 2 A partially-speciﬁed correlated strategy (Q,Y) is an ε-partially-speciﬁed
correlated equilibrium (ε-PSCE ) w.r.t. Y (pi ∈ ∆(Ai)) if with Q-probability 1 − ε, for

















If, in addition, for every player i all the sets (Yi,pi){pi: Q(pi,·)>0} are the same, we say that
the information structure is strategy independent.
The information structure that we deﬁned in Example 2 is not strategy independent.
Deﬁnition 3 A correlated strategy Q ∈ ∆(×i∆(Ai)) is an ε-partially-speciﬁed correlated
strategy if there is an information structure Y such that (Q,Y) is ε-partially-speciﬁed
correlated equilibrium (ε-PSCE ) w.r.t. Y.
In the following example, the information structure is strategy independent, namely
the information a player has about the other players’ strategies does not depend on the
player’s strategy.
8Example 3 Consider the two-player game that appears in Figure 1(A), and consider the










3. That is, with probability 1









































Figure 1: the game and the distributions.
Suppose that player 1 is informed only of the conditional probability of {L,C} and
that player 2 is informed only of the conditional probability of {T,M}. In particular,
when player 1 receives the recommendation to play (1
3, 2
3,0), she knows that player 2 will
play a strategy in {L,C} with probability 1
2 and the pure strategy R with probability 1
2.
Moreover, if she receives the recommendation (0,0,1) (i.e. the pure strategy B), player
1 knows that player 2 will play one of the strategies, L or C, with probability 1.
The mixed strategy (1
3, 2
3,0) is the unique best response to the strategy speciﬁed as 1
2
on {L,C} and 1
2 on the pure strategy R. Indeed, this is the unique maxmin strategy in
the upper-left game in Figure 1(A). Furthermore, playing B is a best response to the
strategy that plays either L or C with probability 1. Similar arguments hold for player 2,
and therefore Q is a 0-partially-speciﬁed correlated equilibrium.
3 Conditional regret-free strategies when probabili-
ties are partially speciﬁed
In this section we describe our no-regret results that are used to prove the main result
of the paper. These results are important on their own right.
93.1 The model of sequential decision problems with imperfect
monitoring
At every period the decision maker (DM) takes an action in a ﬁnite action space A, and
nature chooses a state in a ﬁnite state space Ω. The payoﬀ function of DM is given
by a function u : A × Ω → R. Without loss of generality we assume that all payoﬀs
are bounded between -1 and 1. The monitoring structure of DM is given by a function
s : A × Ω → ∆(S), where S is a ﬁnite set of signals. We assume throughout that the
signal DM receives reveals his action.
Denote by X = ∆(A) and Y = ∆(Ω) the sets of mixed strategies of DM and nature,




ω∈Ω xayωs(a,ω) is the
mixed signal induced by x and y. Since the signal contains the action of DM, given
s(x,y) one can calculate s(a,y) for every a ∈ supp(x), the average signal conditional
that DM chooses repeatedly the action a.
Set M = {s(x,y) ∈ ∆(S): x ∈ X,y ∈ T}. This set contains all possible distributions
over signals that DM may observe, when both DM and nature use stationary strategies.
We refer to an element µ ∈ M as a footprint.
Since the signal contains the action of DM, one can uniquely recover x from s(x,y).
In particular, µ contains the information about the probability that a pure action a is
played. We denote this probability by µ(a).
If s(a,y) = s(a,y0) for every action a in some subset of actions A0 ⊆ A, then DM
cannot distinguish between the two stationary mixed strategies of nature y and y0 by
using only actions in A0. For every µ ∈ M, denote by Y (µ) the set of all stationary
strategies of nature that are consistent with the average signal µ:
Y (µ) = {y ∈ Y : s(a,y) = µ(a) ∀a s.t. µ(a) > 0}.
When nature plays y repeatedly, and DM plays repeatedly x, all DM knows is that
nature’s mixed action is in Y (s(x,y)). As explained in Example 1, this is equivalent to
obtaining a partial speciﬁcation about y.
3.2 Response correspondences
Suppose that DM holds a partially speciﬁed probability about nature, and needs to take
a mixed action from the set X. As described before, DM can calculate at every stage
10the set of all probability distributions over states that are consistent with his signals,
or equivalently, on the set of stationary strategies of nature. Diﬀerent DM’s may react
diﬀerently to the same set of possible stationary strategies played by nature. A decision
maker is characterized by a response correspondence deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 4 A response correspondence of player 1 is a set-valued function R : [0,1]×
M ,→ X that satisﬁes Rε(µ1) = Rε(µ2) whenever Y (µ1) = Y (µ2).
For every ε > 0 and every µ ∈ M, the set Rε(µ) = R(ε,µ) is the set of all DM’s mixed
actions that he perceives to be ε-optimal when the signal he observes is distributed
according to µ. In applications we usually have Rε1(µ) ⊆ Rε2(µ) whenever ε1 < ε2. We
will impose a stronger condition below (see Deﬁnition 6). The requirement that Rε(µ1) =
Rε(µ2) whenever Y (µ1) = Y (µ2) amounts to saying that the response correspondence
depends only on the footprint of nature’s strategy.
Example 4 (Matching Pennies) Consider a decision problem with two states, L and




Assume that the DM has no information about nature’s behavior. From the DM’s point
of view, the set of nature’s possible strategies consists of the set Y of all the distributions
over {L,R}. Assume furthermore that DM wishes to guarantee the best payoﬀ possible
when nature acts in an adversarial manner. The mixed action [1
2(T), 1
2(B)] is then the
unique best response to Y , and6 R∗
ε = [1
2 − ε, 1





for every ε ∈ (1
2,1].
It is worth emphasizing that when DM wishes to maximize the worst case payoﬀ his
best response is often mixed.
We will prove a regret-free result that applies to response correspondences that satisfy
two properties.
6Since DM receives no information, the parameter µ in the deﬁnition of R∗ is superﬂuous.
11Deﬁnition 5 The response correspondence R is robust if for every µ ∈ M and for
every ε0 ∈ (0,1), Rε0(µ) contains inﬁnitely many distinct elements in X that have a full
support.
Suppose that R0(µ) represents the set of all mixed actions of player 1 that are optimal
in some sense w.r.t. µ. A suﬃcient condition for robustness, is that any ε-perturbation
of a strategy in R0(µ) is Kε-optimal, for some ﬁxed K > 0, and thus in RKε(µ).
Deﬁnition 6 The response correspondence R is uniformly continuous if for every ε > 0
there is δ > 0 such that kµ1−µ2k∞ ≤ δ implies Rη(µ2) ⊆ Rη+ε(µ1), for every η ∈ [0,1−ε].
In words, R is uniformly continuous if every mixed action that is η-optimal when
the signals are µ2 is also (η + ε)-optimal when the signals are µ1, provided µ1 and µ2
are suﬃciently close. Since the domain of a response correspondence, [0,1] × M, is a
compact set, uniform continuity of R is equivalent to continuity.
Deﬁnition 7 The response correspondence R is polynomially uniform continuous if
there is a polynomial ϕ which is positive in a neighborhood of 0, such that for every
ε > 0, kµ1 − µ2k∞ ≤ ϕ(ε) implies Rη(µ2) ⊆ Rη+ε(µ1), for every η ∈ [0,1 − ε].
Observe that if R is polynomial uniform continuous then we can assume w.l.o.g. that
ϕ(ε) = εr for some natural number r.
Example 5 (Worst case) As in Example 3, suppose DM wishes to maximize the worst






This is the highest payoﬀ that DM can guarantee when his information is described by µ.
Let R∗
ε(µ) be the set of all mixed actions x such that miny∈Y (µ) u(x,y) ≥ v(µ) − ε. This
response correspondence is robust. By Rosenberg et al. (2004, Lemma 4) the set-valued
function µ → Y (µ) is continuous, and therefore also uniformly continuous. Since the
value operator is non-expansive, this response correspondence is polynomially uniform
continuous.
Example 6 (Maximum entropy) For every µ ∈ M let Y ent(µ) ∈ Y (µ) be nature’s
mixed action that is consistent with µ and maximizes the entropy, that is
Y








12Let Rε(µ) be the set of all ε-best response strategies to Y ent(µ). Then, R is robust, and
as in Example 5 it is uniformly continuous.
3.3 Conditional regret-free strategies
As exhibited by Example 5, an optimal strategy of DM often involves choosing a mixed
action, we allow DM to choose a mixed action at every stage, and to condition his play
on the mixed action he chose in past stages.
Deﬁnition 8 A (behavior) strategy of DM is a function σ : H → ∆(X), where H =
S∞
t=1(X × S)t−1 is the space of all ﬁnite histories.
Since DM only observes the signals, for every strictly mixed action x he plays, he can
calculate at every stage t the empirical frequency of the past signals he received up-to
that stage, whenever he was mixing according to x. Let νt
x ∈ ∆(S) be the empirical
distribution of signals up-to stage t over all past stages where DM mixed according to
x. The distribution νt
x need not be in M. However, by the strong law of large numbers,
with probability 1 νt
x gets closer and closer to M as the number of times x is played
increases. Denote by µt
x ∈ M the closest point in M to νt
x. If x ∈ Rε(µt
x), then x
is ε-optimal against µt
x, implying that DM does not have a severe regret for playing x
instead of another mixed action.
Since the space of mixed actions is inﬁnite, DM may play each mixed action only
ﬁnitely many times, in which case the regret for playing a certain mixed action cannot
diminish. We therefore partition the set of mixed actions into ﬁnitely many small sets,
and lump all mixed actions in the same set. For every subset X0 ⊆ X, let νt
X0 ∈ ∆(S)
be the empirical frequency of signals over the stages where DM mixed according to a
mixed action in X0. Let µt
X0 be the closest footprint in M to νt
X0, and let It
X0 be the set
of stages up to stage t in which DM played a mixed action in X0.
Deﬁnition 9 A strategy σ is ε-conditional regret-free w.r.t. the response correspondence
R if there is δ > 0 such that for every partition of X into sets with diameter smaller













≥ 1 − ε ∀t ≥ T

= 1, (3)
13where X(k) is the atom in the partition of X that contains xk, the mixed action played
at stage k. A strategy is conditional regret-free w.r.t. the response correspondence R if
it is ε-conditional regret-free w.r.t. the response correspondence R for every ε > 0.
Note that the footprint µt
X(k) is (close to) the average signal in those stages where DM
played a mixed action in X(k), and Rε(µt
X(k)) is the set of all mixed actions that are
ε-optimal against it. Thus, a strategy is ε-conditional regret-free w.r.t. the response
correspondence R if, as t goes to inﬁnity, the probability that the mixed actions that
were played in most of the stages up to stage t are ε-optimal increases to 1.
Example 7 Consider a decision problem with two states, L and R, and two pure actions
T and B. The payoﬀs (at the center) and the signals (at the upper-right corner) are given
by:
L R
T 1 a 3 a
B 2 b 0 c
Observe that the signal reveals the action of DM. The stationary strategy T is 0-conditional
regret-free w.r.t. the response correspondence R of maximum entropy that was deﬁned in
Example 6. Indeed, when DM plays repeatedly T he receives no information about na-
ture’s behavior, the empirical distribution over signals is [1(a)]. Then Y ([1(a)]) = Y , and
the stationary strategy y∗ that maximizes the entropy is [1
2(L), 1
2(R)]. The best response
of player 1 against y∗ is indeed T, so that the stationary strategy T is 0-conditional
regret-free w.r.t. R. Even though playing B with low distribution may improve DM’s per-
formance, as he will obtain additional information on nature’s behavior, this pure strategy
is 0-conditional regret-free. In our construction of ε-conditional regret-free strategies DM
will always play each action with a probability which is bounded away from 0, so that the
signals will be as informative as possible.
The stationary strategy T is not 0-conditional regret-free w.r.t. the response corre-
spondence R∗ of worst case that was deﬁned in Example 5. Indeed, when Y ([1(a)]) = Y
the mixed action of DM that maximizes the worst case scenario is [1
2(T), 1
2(B)].
We now explain why it is necessary to require that the response correspondence
is uniformly continuous to obtain regret-free strategies. Denote by yt
X(k) the average
mixed strategy of nature over the stages where DM played a mixed action in X(k).
14When the monitoring is imperfect, yt
X(k) is not known to DM. From the strong law of
large numbers, if DM plays inﬁnitely often mixed actions in X(k), then the diﬀerence
between the theoretical footprint s(yt
X(k)) and the empirical footprint νt
X(k) goes to 0 as
t increases, and therefore the diﬀerence between s(yt
X(k)) and µt
X(k) goes to 0 as well. If
R is uniformly continuous, and if X(k) ⊆ Rε(µt
X(k)), then X(k) ⊆ Rε+η(νt
X(k)), so that
X(k) ⊆ Rε+η(s(yt
X(k))) for every η > 0, provided t = t(η) is large enough. Therefore,
the mixed actions played by DM are ε + η-optimal against the true play of nature,
and not only against the observed signals. Without the requirement that the response
correspondence is uniformly continuous one cannot relate the optimal response against
the observed footprint to the optimal response against the actual behavior of nature,
or even to the optimal response against the footprint which is closest to the observed
signals.
Our ﬁrst result is that an ε-conditional regret-free strategy always exists.
Theorem 1 For every robust and uniformly continuous response correspondence R, and
for every ε > 0, there exists an ε-conditional regret-free strategy w.r.t. R.
By playing in blocks of increasing size, and executing an εk-conditional regret-free
strategy in block k, where (εk)k∈N is a sequence that decreases to 0, one obtains the
existence of a conditional regret-free strategy.
Theorem 2 For every robust and polynomially uniform continuous response correspon-
dence R there exists an conditional regret-free strategy w.r.t. R.
We now explain why it is necessary to require that the response correspondence is poly-
nomially uniform continuous, and it is not enough to require uniform continuity. The
strategy that we construct plays in blocks; the length of block k is Tk and within that
block the player plays an εk-conditional regret-free strategy. The length Tk guarantees
that the probability of the event deﬁned in Eq. (3) is at least 1 − εk. It implies that in
block k, the probability that DM will have a regret is εk.
In order for this strategy to be regret-free, it needs to have two properties. The
ﬁrst is that
P∞
k=1 εk should be ﬁnite, which by the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, implies that
DM will have a regret only in ﬁnitely many blocks. In particular, the regret of DM
at the end of the blocks goes to 0 as the game evolves. The second property is that
the sequence (Tk)k∈N increases suﬃciently slowly, so that the regret at the end of the
blocks being small guarantees that the regret in all stages is small. As εk decreases, Tk
15needs to increase, but in order to satisfy the second property, it needs to grow relatively
slowly, which can be done when the response correspondence is polynomially uniform
continuous.
It is important to note that an ε-conditional regret-free strategy w.r.t. R (or a con-
ditional regret-free strategy w.r.t. R) does not guarantee that the unobserved long-run
average payoﬀ is high. The next deﬁnition of no-regret takes care of this issue.
A partition X1,X2,...,XL of the set of mixed actions X is support preserving if
supp(x) = supp(x0) for every Xl and every x,x0 ∈ Xl. Recall that as long as DM plays
a given set of actions with positive probability, the set of distributions among which he
can distinguish remains the same: if x,x0 ∈ Xl then Y (s(x,y)) = Y (s(x0,l)).
Deﬁnition 10 A strategy σ of DM is ε-conditional regret-free if there is T ∈ N and
δ > 0 such that for every support preserving partition of X into sets with diameter
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 = 1,
where vk is the maxmin level when nature is restricted to play actions in Y (xk,s(y
j
X(k)))
and DM is unrestricted. The strategy is conditional regret-free if it is ε-conditional
regret-free for every ε > 0.
Since player 1 does not observe his payoﬀs, and does not even observe the realized
distribution of the actions of player 2, he cannot calculate his long-run average payoﬀ.
Nevertheless, playing an ε-conditional regret-free strategy guarantees him (up to an ε)
a payoﬀ of at least v(s(yt
X(k))), whenever he played a mixed action in X(k). This safety
level is the maxmin payoﬀ when nature plays an action that is informationally equivalent
to what it really played.
Since the response correspondence R∗ introduced in Example 5 is polynomially uni-
form continuous, applying Theorem 2 to this response correspondence implies that a
conditional regret-free strategy exists. Formally,
Theorem 3 DM has a conditional regret-free strategy.
163.4 Back to n-player games
Suppose that the n-player game G = (N,{Ai}i∈N,{ui}i∈N) is repeatedly played. At
every stage each player i ∈ N chooses an action at
i ∈ Ai, and receives a signal st = s(at),
where a = (at
i)i∈N is the joint action played at stage t, and si : A → ∆(S) is a signalling
function. If each player regards the other n−1 players as “nature”, we reduce the game
into n sequential decision problems.
Theorem 4 In an n-player game with signalling functions, if every player employs an
ε-conditional regret-free strategy, then with probability 1 the empirical distribution of joint
actions converges to the set of 2nε-PSCE .
The goal of this paper is the following straightforward implication of Theorem 3 and
Theorem 4:
Theorem 5 In every game with signalling functions, there is a decentralized process
which induces with probability 1 an empirical distribution of joint actions that converges
to the set of ε-PSCE .
Remark 1 The empirical distribution of joint actions in the procedure we describe below
not only converge to the set of ε-PSCE . It has the additional feature that the information
the players have about others are not correlated. In other words, only the strategies the
players play are correlated, while the information each player has does not depend on the
strategy he is recommended to play.
4 Proofs
4.1 Random vector-payoﬀs games – a background
Blackwell’s approachability theory (Blackwell, 1956) is a useful tool in the study of
regret-free strategies. Luce and Raifa (1958) cite the Blackwell’s7 proof that uses his own
approachability theory of Hannan’s (1957) no-regret theorem. To make the presentation
complete, we brieﬂy review the deﬁnitions and results that we need below.
7Luce and Raifa (1958) refer to Blackwell’s invited address to the Institute of Mathematical Statistics,
Seattle, August 1956, entitled “Controlled random walks”.
17A two-player game with vector payoﬀs is given by an n × m matrix, whose entries
are distributions over Rd, such that for every i = 1,...,n and every j = 1,...,m, the
distribution Wi,j that corresponds to the entry (i,j) has mean wi,j ∈ Rd. At every
stage t the two players, independently and simultaneously, choose actions it ∈ {1,...,n}
and jt ∈ {1,...,m}, and player 1 obtains an Rd-dimensional payoﬀ wt that is chosen
according to the distribution Wit,jt. Player 1 is not informed of the action jt that player
2 chose, but only of the realization wt of Wit,jt.
Denote by wt := 1
k
Pt
k=1 wk the average vector payoﬀ up to stage t. A set C ⊆ Rd
is approachable by player 1 if there is a strategy σ of player 1 that guarantees that wt
gets closer and closer to C: for every ε > 0 there is T ∈ N such that the following holds






t,C) ≤ ε, ∀t ≥ T

= 1.
We say that the strategy σ approaches C.









xi = 1, xi ≥ 0 ∀i
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.
When player 2 plays the mixed action y, it is guaranteed that the average of the means
will be in R2(y), whatever player 1 plays.
Blackwell (1956) provided a geometric condition on the set C that guarantees that
it is approachable. The strategy σ that Blackwell constructed to approach such a set C













Finally, Blackwell, (1956, Theorem 3) proved that a closed and convex set C is approach-
able if and only if R2(y) ∩ C 6= ∅ for every y; that is, if for every mixed action of player
2, there is a mixed action x of player 1 such that the average mean w.r.t. (x,y) lies in C.
4.2 The proof of Theorem 1.
The outline of the proof is as follows. After some deﬁnitions (step 1) we deﬁne an
auxiliary game with random vector-payoﬀs (step 2). Unlike in most of the literature in
8The metric we use throughout is that induced by the sup-norm.
9See Maschler, Solan and Zamir (2007) for this derivation.
18this area, in our game, as in Blackwell’s (1956) seminal work, payoﬀs are random, and
the player only observes the realized payoﬀ, and not the action of the opponent. We
study some properties of the average payoﬀ in this game (step 3), deﬁne a target set C
and prove that it is approachable (step 4). Finally, we prove that every strategy that
approaches C is ε-conditionally regret-free (step 5). The target set that we deﬁne is
close in spirit to the one deﬁned by Blackwell in his alternative proof of Hannan’s (1957)
result.
Step 1: Preparations.
Fix ε ∈ (0, 1
2), and let δ ∈ (0,ε) be given by the deﬁnition of uniform continuity: if
kµ − s(y)k < 4δ then Rη(µ) ⊆ Rη+ε(s(y)) for every η ∈ [0,1 − ε].
Let {y1,y2,...,yL} be a ﬁnite δ-grid of Y : for every y ∈ Y there is l ∈ {1,2,...,L}
such that ky − ylk ≤ δ. For every l deﬁne the closed ball around yl with radius δ:
Yl = {y ∈ Y : ky − ylk ≤ δ}.
Then each Yl is convex and closed, and
SL
l=1 Yl = Y . Moreover, ks(x,y) − s(x,yl)k ≤ δ
for every l, every y ∈ Yl, and every x ∈ X. Let x∗ ∈ X be a mixed action with full
support. For every l ∈ {1,...,L} choose xl ∈ Rε(s(x∗,y∗
l )), such that all (xl)L
l=1 are
distinct and have full support (i.e. supp(xl) = A). Since R is robust this is possible.
Since both x∗ and xl have full support, xl ∈ Rε(s(xl,y∗
l )). Deﬁne X∗ := {xl : 1 ≤ l ≤ L}.
Observe that the number L of mixed actions in X∗ depends on δ, and therefore on ε.
Step 2: Deﬁning an auxiliary game with random vector-payoﬀs.
Deﬁne an auxiliary two-player game with random vector-payoﬀs as follows. The action
set of player 2 is B = Ω, and the action set of player 1 is X∗. The payoﬀ is L|S|-
dimensional, and it serves as a means to keep track of the average signal. Observe that
the dimension depends on δ, and therefore on ε. For every xl and every b ∈ B, the
random payoﬀ W(xl,b) = (Wl0,s0(xl,b))s0∈S
l0=1,...,L ∈ RL|S| is deﬁned as follows:
• The vector W(xl,b) is a unit vector: all coordinates are equal to 0, except of one
that is equal to 1.
• For every l0 6= l and every s0 ∈ S, Wl0,s0(xl,b) = 0.
• For every s0 ∈ S, the probability that Wl,s0(xl,b) = 1 is equal to s(xl,b)(s0).
We therefore obtain that the expectation of W(xl,b), I E(W(xl,b)), is 0 for all coordinates
(l0,s0) such that l0 6= l, and is equal to s(x,b)(s0) in all coordinates (l0,s0) when l0 = l.
19Step 3: Properties of the average payoﬀ in the game with payoﬀ vectors.
Since the stage payoﬀ is a unit vector, the average payoﬀ vector up to stage t, wt, is
an element of the unit simplex of RL|S|. Denote by yt the mixed action played by player
2 at stage t of the auxiliary game, and by It
l the set of all stages up to stage t in which
player 1 played xl. Denote by yt














By the strong law of large numbers, the distance d(wt
l,s(xl,yt
l)) goes to 0, provided that
|It
l| goes to inﬁnity, and by the Azuma inequality, the convergence is uniform over the
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Step 4: Deﬁning a set C, and showing that it is approachable by player 1.
20Since
SL
l=1 Yl = Y , there is at least one l such that s(y) ∈ Yl. For every such index l the
average signal s(xl,y) is a probability distribution over S. Denote by
− →
0 the origin of










where s(xl,y) sits on the coordinates (l,·). Denote Dl = {s(xl,y): y ∈ Yl} and Cl =








Since for every x ∈ X the function y 7→ s(x,y) is linear, and since each Yl is convex
and closed, each Cl is a convex and closed set, so that C is closed. Moreover, a member
of C is a convex combination of elements in the sets Cl. That is, every c ∈ C has a
unique representation, c =
PL
l=1 αlψl(s(xl,zl)), where s(zl) ∈ Ml ⊆ B(s(y∗
l ),δ), αl ≥ 0,
and
PL
l=1 αl = 1.
We now verify that C is an approachable set. By Blackwell (1956, Theorem 3), it is
suﬃcient to prove that for every y ∈ Y , the intersection R2(y)∩C is not empty. However,
for every y ∈ Y , there is l such that y ∈ Yl. Thus, ψl(s(xl,y)) ∈ R2(y)∩Cl ⊆ R2(y)∩C.
Denote by σ a strategy that approaches C in the auxiliary game with vector payoﬀs.
The strategy σ can also be interpreted as a strategy in the original repeated game, as the
only data that it uses is the sequence of past mixed actions in X∗ that player 1 played,
and the sequence of past signals that he received.
Step 5: σ is 2ε-conditional regret-free strategy w.r.t. R.
























l,Cl)}. If d(wt,C) ≤ δ2
|L|, then d(wt
l,Cl) ≤ δ for
every l ∈ Lt (see step 2 above). Together with Eq. (8) we obtain for every strategy τ of






























l),Cl) ≤ 2δ, then d(s(xl,yt
l),xl,s(y∗
l )) ≤ 4δ. Since R is uniformly continuous,
and since xl ∈ Rε(s(xl,y∗
l)), we obtain xl ∈ R2ε(s(xl,yt
l)) (recall the choice of δ at the



























Since δ < ε, σ is indeed 2ε-conditional regret-free.
4.3 The proof of Theorem 2.
As the argument is standard we provide only a sketch of the proof. We construct a
strategy played in blocks. Set εk := 1
k, and let σk be the εk-conditional regret-free
strategy that was constructed in the proof of Theorem 1. Since R is polynomially uniform
continuous, there is a polynomial ϕ(ε) = εr such that Deﬁnition 7 is satisﬁed. Set
δk := εr = k−r. δk takes the role of δ used in the proof of Theorem 1.
As mentioned in Footnote ??, we can assume that the number Lk of mixed ac-
tions used in σk satisﬁes |Lk| ≤ (
2+δk
δk )|S| ≤ 3|S|kr|S|. The length of block k is set
to be Tk = k3(r|S|+4r). From Eq. (9) we obtain that the probability that for at least
one l ∈ LTk, xl 6∈ R2k−1(s(y
Tk
l )) at the end of block k is at most 12·3|S|kr|S|k2r
kr|S|+4r + 4 ·
22|S|k2r|S|k2r exp(− k3(r|S|+4r)
2·3|S|kr|S|·k3r) ≤ b1k−2 + exp(−b2k), where b1 and b2 are positive con-
stants.
Summing up these terms over the blocks k ≥ k0, we obtain that for every k0 ∈ N,
with probability of at most b1k−1+
exp(−b2k)
b2 , there exists k ≥ k0 and l ∈ LTk such that at
the end of block k, xl 6∈ R2k−1(s(y
Tk
l )). This shows that the probability to have a regret
at the end of at least one block shrinks to zero.
To conclude the proof we should consider stages at the middle of the blocks. However,
since the weight of a block relative to its history becomes negligible as k increases (because
Tk
T1+T2+···+T(k−1) goes to 0 as k grows to inﬁnity), the regret at the middle of a block is
predominantly aﬀected by the regret at the end of the previous block. This implies that
the regret goes to zero as time goes by, which shows that the strategy constructed is
ε-conditional regret-free for every ε > 0.
224.4 The proof of Theorem 3.
We apply Theorem 1 to the response correspondence R∗ deﬁned in Example 5. Thus,
R∗
ε(µ) is the set of ε-optimal mixed actions of player 1 in the game G(µ) in which the
sets of mixed actions of the two players are X and Y (µ) respectively, and the payoﬀ
function is u. Denote by v(µ) the value of G(µ). Then
u(x,y) ≥ v(µ) − ε, ∀x ∈ R
∗
ε(µ),y ∈ Y (µ). (10)
As explained in Example 5, R∗ is polynomially uniformly continuous. Therefore, for
every η > 0 there is δ > 0 such that whenever kµ1 − µ2k ≤ δ we have
u(x,y) ≥ v(µ1) − ε − η, ∀x ∈ R
∗
ε(µ1),y ∈ Y (µ2). (11)
It now follows from Deﬁnitions 9 and 10 that every strategy that is ε-conditional regret-
free w.r.t. R∗ is ε-conditional regret-free. The result follows from Theorem 2, when
applied to R.
4.5 The proof of Theorem 4.
Suppose that each player employs an ε-conditional regret-free. Denote by σi player i’s
strategy. For every stage t denote by Qt the empirical frequency of the (mixed) joint
actions played up to stage t. We will show that with a high probability Qt is 2nε-PSCE,
provided t is suﬃciently large.
Fix a player i, and refer to all other players, denoted −i, as nature. Speciﬁcally, X
is the set of player i’s actions and Y is that of the joint strategies (mixed) of −i. For
simplicity denote σ = σi, s = si and τ the (joint) strategy of players −i.
Let X1,...,XK be a partition of X into sets, the diameter of each is suﬃciently
small so that x,x0 ∈ Xk guarantees ks(x,y) − s(x0,y)k1 < ε for every y ∈ Y . Recall
that It
Xk denotes the set of stages until t that a strategy in Xk has been used. Since
σ is ε-conditional regret-free, there is a set K0







t ≥ 1 − ε and ∀k ∈ K0
t,∀t ≥ T, Xk ⊆ Rε(µt





t be the frequency of strategies from Xk up to stage t. Denote by K00
t the
set of k’s such that pk
t ≥ ε
K. Sets Xk with k 6∈ K0
t have been used at most ε of the stages
until stage t. Finally denote by yk
t the average strategy used by −i on It
k. The strong
law of large numbers implies that for every k ∈ K00
t , the asymptotic diﬀerence between
s(x,yk
t ) and the empirical frequency of signals over It
Xk is not larger than ε.
23Denote Kt = K0
t∩K00
t . We obtain that for every k ∈ Kt, Xk ⊆ R2ε(µt
Xk),∀t ≥ T with







As in Example 1, the distribution s(x,yk
t ) is equivalent to getting a partially speciﬁed
probability on the distribution over signals induced by (x,yk
t ).
We obtained that after excluding 2ε of player i’s strategies, his strategies are 2ε
best response to the worst strategy consistent with the signals. In order to obtain this
property for all players one should exclude 2nε of the distribution, which implies that
the probability that Qt is 2nε-PSCE grows to 1 as t grows to inﬁnity.
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